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In the triadic scheme of Translation – Interpretation – Meaning, the basic concept is 
that of meaning as it relates to all kinds of translation and interpretation. Discussing 
the role of meaning in translation semiosis, with special reference to three modes 
of translation presented by Roman Jakobson, I focus on an early semiotic point of 
view, represented by the “proto-semiotician” Victoria Welby (1837–1912). Her triadic 
theory of signs, which she calls “Significs”, involves three modes: sense, meaning, 
and signification. It covers the essence of interpretation as a multifunctional tool 
for analysis of the articulated sign. Welby’s method of “translation” gives language 
a paramount role: all language and all expression are a form of translation as a 
method that “becomes a means both of testing knowledge and of widening its 
range”; in this procedure “we cannot cancel the automatic process of translative 
thinking”. Welby’s ideas are compared with a modern semiotic perspective on issues 
concerning “global semiotics” and “semioethics”. Her significs, as a communication 
oriented theory of signs, is also an early semiotic theory of values (axiology), hence 
relevant to translation studies as well. It is argued that significs is a generic branch 
of knowledge in which “translation” becomes a hermeneutic method for arriving at 
knowledge and understanding.
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“Significs” as a Fundamental Science 
– “What Things Signify”
In 1903, Victoria Welby (1837–1912)1 wrote that her “Significs in fact suggests a new 
starting point to approach the subject of analogy, and implies the emergence of a 
systematic and scientifically valid critique of imagery” ([1903] 1983, 23). Around the 
beginning of the 20th century we can recall the development of the study of meaning; 
e.g., Bréal’s “semantics”, 1897; Peirce’s “semeiotics”, “semeiotic”, “semiotic”, 1894 
ff.; de Saussure’s “semiologie”, 1916; the meaning of meaning, Ogden & Richards, 
19232; Morris’s “semiotic”, 1938, to mention just a few representatives from the 
first decades of the 20th century. The novelty of Welby’s approach is, to quote 
Eschbach (1983, xxviii), in her “conception of the theory of signs as a universally 
valid, fundamental branch of science”. Welby’s writings have been discussed by, for 
instance, Eschbach (1983), Mannoury (1983), Schmitz (1985), and Petrilli (1998). 
My focus is on the relevance of Welby’s ideas for translation and interpretation with 
special reference to the problem of meaning, especially her idea on “translation” as 
a method for “translative thinking” that produces new knowledge.
As early as in her essay Sense, Meaning and Interpretation (1896), Welby 
discusses the three interwoven fields: the constitution of meaning, the function of 
signs in human interaction, and the ethics of terminology, on one hand, and on the 
other, the effects of these for the formation of significs (i.e., for semiotic theory) 
and for semiotic and hermeneutic maxims, even though the terms “semiotics” or 
“hermeneutics” do not appear in her texts, as Eschbach also notes (1983, xi, cf. 
note 2, xxix–xxx). Her major work What is Meaning? Studies in the Development of 
Significance ([1903] 1983) deals with the search for the meaning of “meaning”, in the 
triadic frame of “sense”, “meaning”, and “significance” / “signification”, elaborating 
on the fundamental aspects of her theory of signs, which she christens “Significs”.3 
1  At the end of 19th century and in the beginning of the 20th century, Welby carried on extensive 
correspondence with scholars (e.g., Charles S. Peirce, William James, F. C. S. Schiller, Giovanni 
Vailati, Mario Calderoni, Bertrand Russell, F. Cook Wilson, and C. K. Ogden), and she had 
memberships in learned societies, which gave her an intermediary role in spreading of scientific 
ideas (Eschbach 1983, xiv). On Welby’s significance in the history of ideas and her influence on 
some of her contemporaries, see especially remarks on the correspondence between Peirce and 
Welby in Hardwick (ed.) 1977, Schmitz (1983, cviii–clxxxiv); for a detailed list of Welby’s publications, 
cf. Schmitz (1983, ccxxiv–ccxxxiii). Biographical information on Welby and her place in the history of 
semiotics, cf. Eschbach (1983), Mannoury (1983), Schmitz (1985), and Petrilli (1998).
2  On the connection between Welby and Ogden, cf. Mannoury (1983, xxxiii); and Schmitz (1985, 
clxxviii–clxxxiv).
3  Welby writes in a letter to the French linguist Michel Bréal (1832–1915), the founder of the 
term “semantics”, on November 10, 1900: “It is now decided that this is to be called SIGNIFICS as 
the study of the sign, especially of course the articulate sign, and its various modes and degrees of 
value which we call sense, meaning, signification, import, purport, significance, (and others). […] 
You will see that it must include your own great study”. Bréal’s book Essai de sémantique (science 
des significations) was published 1897, English trans. by Welby’s daughter Mrs Henry Cust = Nina 
(Emmeline) Cust, as Semantics: Studies in the Science of Meaning (1900). 
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Welby, as a proto-semiotician, had an important influence on the thought of the 
American philosopher, logician and semiotician Charles S. Peirce (1839–1914), as 
Houser (1998, xviii) points out: “[Welby’s] attentive interest in his [Peirce] semiotic 
ideas encouraged him to develop his theory of signs more fully than he would 
have without her”. In 1903, Peirce reviewed her book in The Nation 77 (15 Oct. 
1903, 308–309), and in the same year they also began their correspondence. In 
his Lowell Lectures in 1903, What Makes a Reasoning Sound? (EP 2.242–257, 
1903), Peirce writes:
A little book by Victoria Lady Welby has lately appeared entitled What is Meaning? 
The book has sundry merits, among them that of showing that there are three modes 
of meaning. But the best feature of it is that it presses home the question “What is 
meaning?” A word has meaning for us in so far as we are able to make use of it in 
communicating our knowledge to others and in getting at the knowledge that these 
others seek to communicate to us. That is the lowest grade of meaning. The meaning 
of a word is more fully the sum total of all the conditional predictions which the person 
who uses it intends to make himself responsible for or intends to deny. That conscious 
or quasi-conscious intention in using the word is the second grade of meaning. But 
besides the consequences to which the person who accepts a word knowingly commits 
himself, there is a vast ocean of unforeseen consequences which the acceptance of 
the word is destined to bring about, not merely consequences of knowing but perhaps 
revolutions of society. One cannot tell what power there may be in a word or a phrase 
to change the face of the world; and the sum of the consequences makes up the third 
grade of meaning. (EP 2.255–257, [1903]; CP8.176; Peirce’s italics)
In the above quotation, we see triadic thinking; the first is sense (possible 
meanings), the second is meaning as “intention”, and the third is meaning as 
significance, together forming the triadic idea. In Welby’s significs these three 
modes of meaning form a triadic system, and thus, as Peirce writes, it is important 
to investigate the problem of meaning: “what power there will be in a word or a 
phrase to change the face of the world”. In Welby’s system we notice a parallel 
to Peirce’s triadic ontological categories of Firstness (potentiality), Secondness 
(causality), and Thirdness (EP 1.296–297, [1891]). Peirce deals with these in his 
sign theory and in his philosophical and logical thinking, that is to say, in his studies 
of the sign’s relation to truth and reality, for instance, in his Architecture of Theories 
(EP 1.296–297, [1891]). In What Is Meaning? ([1903] 1983, 6, 46), even though 
“rather vague” in her expression (as Mannoury, too, points out; 1983, xxxvii), Welby 
presents the kernel ideas of her significs in efforts to shape a fundamental and 
universal theory of signs:
There is, strictly speaking, no such thing as the Sense of a word, but only the sense in 
which it is used – the circumstances, state of mind, reference, “universe of discourse” 
belonging to it. The Meaning of a word is the intent which it is desired to convey – the 
intention of the user. The Significance is always manifold, and intensifies its sense as 
well as its meaning, by expressing its importance, its appeal to us, its moment for us, its 
Translation – Interpretation – Meaning
133
emotional force, its ideal value, its moral aspect, its universal or at least social range. All 
science, all logic, all philosophy, the whole controversy about æsthetics, about ethics, 
about religion, ultimately concentrate upon this: What is the sense of, What do we mean 
by, What is the significance of, that is, Why do we care for, Beauty, Truth, Goodness? 
Why do we value experience? And why do we seek for Significance, and resume the 
value of innumerable observed facts under formulæ of significance like gravitation or 
natural selection? Because we are the Expression of the world, as it were, “expressed 
from” it by the commanding or insistent pressure of natural stimuli not yet understood. 
(Welby [1903] 1983, 5–6)
Quite modern, from semiotic and pragmatic points of view, are Welby’s 
expressions “used”, “the circumstances”, “state of mind”, “reference”, and “universe 
of discourse”, that is to say, her pragmatic and functional view of the role of language 
in the constitution of meaning (semiosis, signification). Significs seems therefore 
to represent a dynamic view of meaning. Also central to all kinds of translation and 
interpretation is what she says about how we must learn to “signify” and “signalise”: 
Man questions and an answer is waiting for him. But first he must learn to speak, really 
to “express” himself and the world. To do that he must learn to signify and to signalise. 
He must discover, observe, analyse, appraise, first the sense of all that he senses 
through touch, hearing, sight, and to realise its interest, what it practically signifies for 
him; then the meaning – the intention – of action, the motive of conduct, the cause of 
each effect. Thus at last he will see the Significance, the ultimate bearing, the central 
value, the vital implication – of what? of all experience, all knowledge, all fact, and all 
thought. (Welby [1903] 1983, 6; Welby’s italics)
Hence, in significs, which is none other than a theory of signs and their 
significance and signification, the key terms are “experience” and “expression of 
the world”, along with other concepts such as “the reference”, “types of experience”, 
“types of knowledge”, “three grades of levels of consciousness (and therefore of 
experience)”; “three main levels or classes of expression-value” (Welby [1903] 
1983, 30, 46, 48, 94–95; 163, 233; Welby [1911] 1985, 79). In the universe of 
discourse, expression and experience are central terms: 
There is just now a marked tendency to confess that Experience is a concept 
which imperatively needs both expansion and enrichment. […] Experience can only 
be enriched through the acquirement in a broad sense of fresh symbols or fresh 
significance: expression needs development in the same way for the same reason. 
Thus it follows that, as already suggested, every conceivable form of human interest is 
centrally touched and transformed by Significs. […] (Welby [1903] 1983, 6–7)
In order to define significs, Welby presents varied terms and metaphorical 
contexts for sense, meaning, and significance, listed in a figure by Schmitz (1985, 
xcvi–xcvii). In these definitions the problem of meaning is seen to lie in a theory of 
value, “ideal value”, a paramount idea in her significs:
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We have already touched upon some forms of this triad, which may also be put as 
signification, intention and ideal value. From this point of view, the reference of sense 
is mainly instinctive, of meaning volitional, and of significance moral; we have a sense 
of discomfort, a thing is true in a certain sense, we mean (i.e. intend) to do something, 
and we speak of some event, “the significance of which cannot be over-rated”. (Welby 
([1903] 1983, 46)
Welby wrote in a letter of December 4, 1908 (Hardwick 1977, 63) to Peirce: “I 
come to what is my business though in a much more elementary sense than is 
yours. I mean the essential value of Sign; ‘so to speak, the Sign’s Soul’. For that, as 
you know, under the term Significs and the phrase what things signify, is my special 
interest”. Regarding which methods we can apply to this triadic thinking of meaning, 
Welby states that significs suggests an approach by means of “analogy”, which 
“implies the emergence of a systematic and scientifically valid critique of imagery”, 
as quoted above. Thus, significs, as she believed, “obviously makes for a new dew 
departure in philosophy as well as in psychology” (op. cit., 23, 52, 245). “Analogy”, 
she writes, is, “the only method we have for most of our mental work, involved 
indeed in its primary presuppositions, i.e. the likeness between our reader’s mind 
and our own. This we have to assume though we cannot prove it, or our writing 
becomes an absolute waste. No one can even controvert this statement, giving 
reasons for dissent, without the use of analogy” (op. cit., 24). Hence, her ways to 
solve the problem of sense, meaning, and signification are connected with terms 
like “translative thinking”, “analogy”, “expression”, and “values” (op. cit., 19, 20, 
126, 161, 194) – paramount concepts in her significs. Language, however, plays 
the central role, because “all language and all expression is a form of translation: 
(op. cit., 127), she writes, quoting R. L. Nettleship’s Philosophical Lectures and 
Remains (1897, vol. 1, 86). Welby states that significs extends and develops that 
idea in practical directions. It is a method “both of discovering, testing, and using 
analogy (or in some cases homology), the value of which does not yet seem to 
be recognised; and this may be called in an extended sense Translation” (Welby 
[1903] 1983, 126). We shall return to the concept of translation later.
In 1911, Welby published another book on the logic of signs, meaning and 
signification, entitled Significs and Language: The Articulate Form of Our 
Expressive and Interpretative Resources, which continued her inquiry into the 
nature of interpretation. In her last major work, which appeared only a year before 
her death, she gives the following overview of the theory of sign (“Significs”):
SignificS may be briefly and provisionally defined as the study of the nature of Significance 
in all its forms and relations, and thus of its working in every possible sphere of human 
interest and purpose. But the fact that this study is completely neglected even in the 
education renders a fully satisfactory definition difficult at present to formulate. The 
interpretative function is, in truth, the only one in any direct sense ignored or at least 
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casually treated. And yet it is that which naturally precedes and is the very condition of 
human intercourse, as of man’s mastery of his world. (Welby [1911] 1985, Preface, vii) 
The interpretative function is, according to Welby ([1911] 1985, 10), the kernel 
idea in education, being “the essential value of Sign”. She continues: “[…] that 
the one crucial question in all Expression, whether by action or sound, symbol 
or picture, is its special property, first of Sense, that in which it is used, then of 
Meaning as the intention of the user, and, most far-reaching and momentous of 
all, of implication, of ultimate Significance” (op. cit., 9). This is “the very condition 
of human intercourse”; it is “Simply the whole of human intercourse”, claims Welby 
([1903] 1983, 36).
Semiosis in Interpretative and Translative Processes
For the study of meaning in language, culture, and communication, and hence 
implicating “translation” in modern semantics, pragmatics and semiotics, the study 
of semiosis – as the act of signification, the production of signs and significance, 
the sign in process and progress – is a central idea in the constitution of meaning 
by discursive or translative thinking. In the 1970s, Leech ([1974] 1985, ix) wrote 
about the status of semantics as a basis for such study: 
Semantics is central to the study of communication […] Semantics is also at the centre 
of the study of the human mind – thought processes, cognition, conceptualization – 
all these are intricately bound up with the way in which we classify and convey our 
experience of the world through language. (Leech [1974] 1985, ix)
Among the crucial research objects of semiotic studies is translation as a method, 
that is, how we “translate” signs into other signs. It is crucial not only for translation 
proper (interlingual translation) but also for other kinds of translation procedures 
(intralingual and intersemiotic translation) in language, cognition, communication 
and culture. Roman Jakobson’s presented “three modes of translation” in his essay 
“On Linguistic Aspects of Translation” ([1959] 1987, 428–435):4 
(1) Intralingual translation or rewording is an interpretation of verbal signs by means of 
other signs of the same language.
(2) Interlingual translation or translation proper is an interpretation of verbal signs by 
means of some other language.
(3) Intersemiotic translation or transmutation is an interpretation of verbal signs by 
means of signs of nonverbal sign systems. (Jakobson [1959] 1987, 429)
4  Cf. also Torop (2003, 271–282) on intersemiosis and intersemiotic translation.
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Hence, the concept of translation can be applied to all kinds of signs and sign 
systems, particularly to the interactions between these (trans-processes), in which 
the signs remain the at once the same and other. It is not our primary aim here to 
try to answer the vast question, “What is meaning?”, as Welby asks in her book title. 
Rather, as she also does, we look at how the word is “used” in its “circumstances” 
and in the “universe of discourse” (Welby [1903] 1983, 5–6). Later representatives of 
pragmatics and semantics (e.g., Austin, Searle, Wittgenstein, Grice) did the same: 
they looked for the use of signs and their relations in discourse and communication, 
in speech acts and in language games. The hermeneutic triangle of translation, 
interpretation and meaning (cf. Gadamer [1960] 1993, 383–389, 396, 527–528; 
[1976] 1997, 59–68) is fundamental in translative processes, which is why a semiotic 
point of view of the constitution of meaning seems to be a relevant one. Translation 
processes and products require different theoretical and methodological approaches 
to the study of signs and various sign systems in semiosis; for example, the producing 
and interpreting of signs in dialogue (cf. Bakhtin’s idea of dialogism, 1981), in their 
transference from A to B. Hence, translation is not only a phenomenon concerning 
translation proper (interlingual translation) between languages and cultures, but 
as an interpretative process in various fields. “In the first place, to translate is to 
interpret”, writes Petrilli (2003a, 17). The translation process is actually a paradox: 
the same sign is always “the same other, for in order to be itself and continue 
being so, it must become other in intersign or transsign interpretation/translation 
processes”, as Petrilli (op. cit., 33) states, referring to certain of Peirce’s views. The 
latter author wrote (CP 2.230) that “nothing is a sign unless it is interpreted as a 
sign”, that signs do not exist without an interpretant (CP2.228), that the meaning 
of a sign can only be expressed by another sign acting as its interpretant. In short, 
translation is constitutive of the sign, which indeed makes semiosis something like 
a translative process parallel to Welby’s ([1903] 1983, 34) idea: “We cannot cancel 
the automatic process of translative thinking. Everything suggests or reminds us of 
something else”. This idea is also found in the anthology Translation Translation, 
in which Petrilli (2003a, 17–37; 2003b, 41–53), Ponzio (2003a, 13–16), and other 
scholars present the issue of “translation” as an interdisciplinary approach including 
fields such as semiotics, linguistics, literary criticism, philosophy, biology, and the 
medical sciences. The problem of translation is discussed in the book from various 
perspectives as an intertextual relation.
In accordance with Welby ([1903] 1983, 161, 230), who sees her new science 
of significs to be relevant for practical life and education, Petrilli (2003a, 33–34) 
also states that translation is a primary concern for education (didactics) in addition 
to theory, such that “meaning” is the starting point for interpretation and translation. 
This is true when we read, analyze and translate various kinds of traditional texts, 
and also complex texts of today having many functions at the same time. These last 
are so-called multi- or polysemiotic texts; multimodal text types, such as television, 
film, video, subtitling, web texts, drama, “from page to stage”, opera, vocal texts 
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with various channels (sound, image, oral and written speech, music texts, etc.); 
such texts go from verbal to non-verbal texts and vice versa. “Translation” can be 
seen as a method of “translative thinking” by which to learn to read various texts 
and to interpret the processes between signs and sign systems, that is, to reveal 
implicit and explicit structures of the intersemiotic nature of texts.
We can also interpret the concept of translation as a “global” issue, to borrow 
from Sebeok’s (2001) concept of “global semiotics”. Processes of translation, if 
we restrict it to translation proper (interlingual translation), exemplify how culture-
bound and localized texts become global. Conversely, such processes show 
how global texts become culturally “local” through localized translation activities.5 
Local becomes global becomes local becomes global ad infinitum … through 
“translation” and translative thinking that is meant to gain new knowledge. Hence 
for education, translation as a means of interpreting and understanding is of 
paramount importance. As Ponzio (2003a, 13) writes: “With reference to Europe, 
our interest in translation responds to new community needs. On an international 
level and in the context of globalization the problem of translation is no less than 
fundamental”. He continues: 
Translation concerns verbal texts in their relations among different languages; 
translation does not only deal with verbal signs, but it means internal plurilingualism, a 
plurality of different languages which relate to each other through translation processes. 
Translation occurs between verbal languages and nonverbal languages as well as 
among different nonverbal languages without necessarily involving verbal languages. 
Approached in this way it is obvious that translation cannot be restricted to the domain 
of linguistics only but necessarily involves semiotics, the general science of the theory 
of signs […]. (Ponzio 2003a, 14)
The idea of combining semiotics and translation is inherent in the following 
statement by Ponzio (2003a, 14): “Where there are signs, or, better, where there 
are semiosic processes there is translation”. In accordance with Torop (2003, 271–
282), we can also state that translation has an inherently intersemiotic character, an 
idea which Petrilli (2003b, 41) also formulates when she talks about translatability 
in terms of a semiotic order: 
The question of the translatability of a text must be connected to the problem of the 
meaning of a sign and to the fact that this cannot be circumscribed to the type of 
sign and sign system a sign belongs to. From this point of view translatability may be 
explained in terms of a semiotic order. (Petrilli 2003b, 41)
These few examples from modern discussions on semiotics and translation 
show some important parallels to Welby’s early thinking. Firstly, there is the role 
5  Cf. the discussion on foreignizing and domestication in translation studies in Venuti 1995, passim; 
cf. also Paloposki 2002, passim, in her research on Variation in Translation.
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of significs in science, the global relevance of semiotics today. In his book Global 
Semiotics, Sebeok (2001, 1–2, 8–9) discusses what the title means, first of all 
in terms of a network, or a web, as he had described it as early as in the 1970s. 
Each sign maintains itself as a part of a larger “semiotic web”, and to understand 
how a sign is maintained in its proper being is the project of semiotics. Sebeok 
(2001, 1–2; 8, 9) coined the term “global semiotics”, and talked about signs in the 
biosphere, “life signs”, i.e., life = semiotics. The terms “semiotic web” and “global 
semiotics” stand for the production and exchange of signs. 
Secondly, key to all semiotic research is Welby’s dynamic and process-oriented 
notion of sense, meaning and significance, (i.e., semiosis) as the act of signification 
in use and discourse in communication. Thirdly, significs corresponds to the modern 
idea of values, to “semioethics”, with its concern about ethics in signification – which 
is also a central issue in modern translation studies as well (e.g., Chesterman 1997, 
169–194; Koskinen 2000, passim). With Welby and Peirce, “translation may be 
considered to be implicit in the concept of sign itself”, remarks Petrilli (2003b, 41). 
In fact, a sign is not possible without an interpretant, according to Peirce, that is, 
without another sign that explains its meaning. In other words, “meaning subsists 
in the relation of reciprocal translation among signs […] meaning and translation 
are semiotic phenomena whether interpretation/translation processes occur in the 
verbal sign system, among the sectorial languages of a single historical-natural 
language – intralingual translation – or among different historical-natural languages 
– interlingual translation” (Petrilli, ibid.). 
As argued above, translation can be seen as a fundamental procedure for 
interpreting sign and sign systems. For Ponzio (2003a, 13–16; 2003b, 55–68), 
crucial to both semiotics and translation are the activities of modeling and dialogue; 
and in this dialogue arises the concept of “semioethics”, which concerns issues 
regarding value and human responsibility (cf. Petrilli 2004a, 1–9; 2004b, 23–38; 
Deeley 2005: 1–13). Petrilli (2003a, 17–37; 2003b, 42–53)6 sees translation and 
semiosis as fundamental procedures not only in the anthroposemiosphere, but also 
in the whole biosphere. The latter claim is made by Sebeok (2001, 11), in reference to 
Yuri Lotman’s (1990: 203) idea of “semiosphere” as “a complex semiotic mechanism 
which is in constant motion” […] as the semiotic space necessary for the existence 
and functioning of languages”. According to Sebeok (2001, 2), Roman Jakobson 
(cf. [1975] 1987, 436–454) was the first to define semiotics as an inquiry into the 
communication of all kinds of messages (op. cit., 454), which are in turn composed 
of signs. Sebeok (2001, 2) proposes to amplify this idea: “The subject matter of 
semiotics […] is the exchange of any messages whatsoever and of the systems of 
6  Cf. Petrilli (2003, 19) for a figure on the typology of translation in the biosemiosphere and in the 
anthroposemiosphere.
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signs which underlie them [...].7 For Peirce, the universe was itself a comprehensive 
global sign, “a vast representamen, a great symbol […]” (CP 5.119). According to 
Peirce, “the entire universe” is not merely “perfused with signs” but “composed 
exclusively of signs” (CP 5.448n). This was also Welby’s idea of significs when 
she talked about the “universe of discourse”. From Peirce’s claim it follows that 
semiotics is per definitionem relevant, and is an analytical tool for every actual and 
conceivable province of knowledge, as Sebeok claimed (2000, 2–3, 8–9). 
As Schmitz (1985, x) states, Welby belonged to two worlds: to the early 
Victorian era on the one hand and, in view of her own studies and her trust in 
scientific progress, to the threshold of the future. We can say that she represented 
a “global semiotics” of her time, an interdisciplinary view, espoused in her writings 
and correspondence as concerning the constitution of meaning in various fields by 
means of “translation”.
Translation as a Method  
– Language as a Form of Translation 
Significs is a universal theory of signs based on the view that language makes all 
thought possible, and, “all language and all expression is a form of translation” 
(Welby [1903] 1983, 127). For Welby, significs was not, as Schmitz (1985, x) 
states, a mere collective term for the stages of enquiry into the three dimensions 
of meaning; rather she conceived of a universal theory of signs (cf. Welby [1903] 
1983, 4–7), actually, what semiotics is today. This theory should be developed into 
“a polyfunctional tool” as versatile as the system of symbolic numerals and the 
alphabet. Hence, Welby’s ideas on the dialogue between various scientific fields 
were already “interdisciplinary” (cf. also Sebeok 2001, 8–9) in suggesting a view, 
not only of language and language philosophy or psychology, but for science in 
general (e.g., the exact terminology of sciences) and for education as well: 
Thus Significs involves essentially and typically the philosophy of Interpretation, of 
translation, and thereby of a mode of synthesis accepted and worked with by science 
and philosophy alike; profoundly modifying what we wrongly call the “root” idea of 
religion, of ethics, of poetry, of art, and lastly, of practical life in all forms. But if studied 
systematically it would be seen from the first to provide a method of observation, a mode 
of experiment which extends far beyond the laboratory, and includes the inductive and 
deductive methods in one process. (Welby [1903] 1983, 161)
For Welby language was the starting point, and she has several comments also 
on “the tyranny of language” (op. cit., 58), particularly the ambiguity and fuzziness 
7  Deeley (2004, 187–228) discusses the interplay of translation and interpretation in the 
founding of semiotics.
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of language.8 Her critique of the language of her time and of the vagueness of 
scientific terminologies “places the diagnostic aspect of signific investigative 
procedures in the forefront” (Schmitz 1983, lxxxviii). Welby’s significs forecasted 
future concerns with terminological research (cf. the modern term LSP: Language 
for Specific Purposes referring to the study of special texts in translation studies), 
and her efforts to fight ambiguity and vagueness in language were remarkably 
prescient (cf. Fight the Fog in the language policy and language planning of the 
European Union today).9 In her book What Is Meaning? Welby wrote: “What we do 
want is a really plastic language” ([1903] 1983, 60), that is, to write and act in such 
a way as to achieve conceptual clarification (op. cit., 73–78).
What is Welby’s method for obtaining such an explicit language? A central 
process in analysing meaning is that of “Significs as Translation”; the latter is an 
essential method of significs (Welby [1903] 1983, 51). By “translation” she does not 
mean “the rendering of one language into another”, but a methodical construction 
of analogies, primarily of proportional, structural and functional analogies (Welby 
[1903] 1983, 126–127). With Schmitz (1985, lxxxviii), we can state that in Welby’s 
What is Meaning? (1903) there is a close relation between the role of analogy in 
thought processes, communication, and the central nature of language on the one 
hand, and her conception of “translation” on the other. She presents “translation” 
as a means “both of discovering, testing, and using analogy” […] (Welby [1903] 
1983, 126–129). In particular, she discusses concepts such as “transference”, 
“transformation”, “transmutation”, “transfiguration”, and, above all, “transvaluation” 
(op. cit., 126), a term she emphasises in the translation process as it relates to the 
triad of “sense”, “meaning”, and “significance”, which are for her levels or classes 
of “expression value” (cf. Schmitz 1985, lxxxviii).10 For Welby ([1903] 1983, 153), 
communication of thoughts is “the very supposition of all thinking, and is essentially 
translation in the sense now suggested, that is, as including transformation, 
transmutation, and transfiguration, making translucent and transparent […]”. In her 
struggles to achieve conceptual clarification and purification, she describes her 
method:
. . . it must be borne in mind that the significance is infinitely rich in its aspects, yielding 
a world of delicate reactions to the complexities of varying mind in races, societies, and 
individuals. But, as we have already seen, significance must not be confounded with 
the meaning or intention of acts and events; it is rather their value for us, that which 
8  Cf. also Schmitz (1983, lxxvi–cviii) on Significs as a communication-oriented theory of signs, and 
Welby’s critique of language and terminology, as well as “translation” and the unity of science.
9  She offered a prize, the so-called Welby Prize, in 1896 for an investigation on the prevailing 
obscurity and confusion in psychological and philosophical terminology, and how a change might be 
brought about (cf. Mannoury 1983, xxxviii). Cf. also the ethics of terminology discussed by Welby and 
Peirce (e.g.,  Hardwick [ed.] 1977, 69; CP 2.219–226, [1903]; EP 2.263–266, [1903]).
10  “Translation” and the unity of science are discussed by Schmitz (1985, lxxxviii–xciii).
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makes them signify for us, that which constitutes their importance, their moment, their 
consequence for mankind. (Welby [1903] 1983, 100)
Here significs takes on the dimensions Sebeok (2001, 1–16) writes about in 
his global semiotics on life-signs. Semiosis and significance is, as Welby ([1903] 
1983, 120) writes, “the assimilating, the life-generating, the life-crowning term”; it 
has a deep and predictive sense. Hence, Welby’s essential method is “translation”, 
translative thinking, a procedure that “becomes a means both of testing knowledge 
and of widening its range” ([1911] 1985, 129), as discussed earlier. But language 
also manifests vagueness: 
But, unfortunately, language itself has long ago decided that whether we will or no we 
shall use it or be content to forgo speech entirely. We cannot cancel the automatic 
process of translative thinking. Everything suggests or reminds us of something else. 
What have we just said? Mischief “lies in” the “strength” of something: “constraint”, 
“process”, “translative” – every word calls up more or less consciously some physical 
experience transferred to the mental sphere. “Transferred”, “sphere” – once more we 
are ensnared; “ensnared” again a case in point, and so on. (Welby [1903] 1983, 34)
“We cannot cancel the automatic process of translative thinking. Everything 
suggests or reminds us of something else”, Welby writes (op. cit., 34). To distinguish 
the three modes of meaning (sense, meaning, and significance) that Welby calls 
“Significs”, “the very idea of Significance […] [of the] sign and what it signifies at 
its lowest and humblest, [. . .] leads us to a fresh study of sense [and] to a fresh 
study of meaning which shows us significance as the key of keys to reality” (op. 
cit., 246). Hence, semiosis means the process of signification wherein three modes 
of meaning are manifested, as discussed by Peirce (cf. EP 2.242–257, [1903]).11 
Welby’s ideas on the three modes of meaning ([1903] 1983, passim; [1911] 
1985, passim) and Peirce’s views on intentional, effectual and communicational 
interpretants (EP 2.478, [1906]) are the key concepts of interpretation and of 
translation semiosis. In his letter to Welby in the spring of 1906, Peirce writes about 
his use of the word “Sign”, and how signs “grow” in semiosis: “I use the word ‘Sign’ 
in the widest sense for any medium for the communication or extension of a Form 
(or feature)” (EP 2.477, 1906). In the signification, production and interpretation of 
signs, Peirce distinguishes the following triadic relations: 
There is the Intentional Interpretant, which is a determination of the mind of the utterer; 
the Effectual Interpretant, which is a determination of the mind of the interpreter; and 
the Communicational Interpretant, or say the Cominterpretant, which is a determination 
of that mind into which the minds of utterer and interpreter have to be fused in order 
11  Cf. Kukkonen (2001, 121–138) on the concept of flux and knowledge in translation studies, 
and the production of meaning as “What is becoming?”, “a would-be” state of affairs in the act of 
semiosis (see Theaetetus 142a–210d); Peirce’s view on fallibilism: “For fallibilism is the doctrine that 
our knowledge is never absolute but always swims, as it were, in a continuum of uncertainty and of 
indeterminacy” (CP 1.171, c. [1897]; cf. EP 2.410–411, [1907]; cf. also Merrell 2003, 165–188).
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that any communication should take place. This mind may be called the commens. It 
consists of all that is, and must be, well understood between utterer and interpreter, at 
the outset, in order that the sign in question should fulfill its function. (EP 2.477–478, 
1906) 
For translation studies, these three terms are crucial; new knowledge grows 
from sameness and likeness, or as Ponzio (2003a, 16) puts it: “The paradox of 
translation consists in the fact that the text must remain the same while becoming 
other […]”, and “translation is the same other” (Ponzio 2003b, 55–68, Ponzio’s 
italics) in semiosis through intentional, effectual and communicational interpretation. 
The idea of the growth of knowledge is present also in Welby’s view, for instance, 
in the following passages:
Significance, then, fully resumes, in transfigured form, all that is summed up (1) in the 
idea of Motion, force, energy, activity, function, (2) in the idea of Sense (in all senses) 
and in that of Meaning (intention, purport, purpose). The concern for reality is the 
ultimate tie between the ‘plain man’, the scientific man and the philosopher. (Welby 
[1903] 1983, 50) […]. Language is still in what we have to express by that vague and 
misused word, the “instinctive’ stage”. (Op. cit., 52) 
As pointed out, the application of significs involves language, analogy, 
comparison, expression, experience, and translation; the translative thinking method 
is at the same time both unity and distinction; sense, meaning and signification 
grow in “use” and in “the universe of discourse”. In the following quotation we find 
Welby’s early notions concerning her “Idea of Translation”:
The Idea of Translation in all its applications naturally implies the recognition of 
Distinction, and starts from the conception (or principle) of Equation, which is in the 
quantitative what translation (the discovery and application of the common element 
in the diverse or different) is in the qualitative sphere. (Welby [1903] 1983, 148–149.) 
[…]. As Translation involves both unity and distinction (the one actually and the other 
implicitly), language must itself be recognised as the means of discovering contrasts 
together with the links which constitute them element of unity, or at least completely 
exclude the idea of final disparateness (op. cit., 150) […] aspect of Translation in its 
transformative character […]. (Op. cit., 153)
Her vast method, with parallels to “global semiotics” and “global semiosis” (cf. 
Sebeok 2001), is defined in the following way:
SignificS, then, will bring us the philosophy of Significance; i.e. a raising of our whole 
conception of meaning to a higher and more efficient level; a bringing cosmos out of the 
present “chaos” of our ideas as to sense, meaning, and significance, and showing us 
that we need to use these terms in a certain order of value and range. Its best type of 
metaphor is the “solar”, its best mine of analogy is the biological; because, as implying 
an extension of purview given us in spatial form by (post-Copernican) astronomy, it 
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tends to relate the idea of life to the ideas of motion and matter, and moreover to relate 
the idea of mind to both. (Welby [1903] 1983, 161)
For Welby significs presented a challenge to education, “a new way of looking 
at things” in interpreting carefully the three modes of meaning (sense, meaning, 
and signification). Significs, with its essential method as that of “translation”, leads 
to the following conclusions:
[…] This led us to the suggestion of a method of Translation in a sense wider than 
any in which the word has yet been applied. An examination of the implications of 
this idea brought us to a definition of man as in one sense the Expression of the 
world. […] We proceeded to show that, in any full sense, a new start could only be 
accomplished by a generation which for the first time had been universally trained to 
recognise the central importance of sense, meaning, and significance: to distinguish 
and rightly to interpret all three. Such a training of the future is here called Significs, 
[…]. (Welby [1903] 1983, 245–246) 
A parallel idea to this can be found in Jakobson’s ([1959] 1987, 428–435) “three 
modes of translation”, especially intralingual translation (rewording) and other 
kinds of translation procedures, such as intersemiotic translation (cf. Petrilli 2003a; 
2003b; Ponzio 2003a; 2003b; Torop 2003; Deeley 2005). In regard to semiotics, 
as la science du signe et des signes, Jakobson ([1975] 1987, 454) states also 
that it has “the right and duty to study the structure of all of the types and systems 
of signs and to elucidate their various hierarchical relationships, the network of 
their functions, and the common or differing properties of all systems” (Jakobson’s 
italics). “Translation”, for Welby too, is the unity of science, in which language plays 
the leading role in her signific method: “[…] we must begin in the broadest sense 
with Expression, and reach this through language”, i.e. with a language that is 
transparent and plastic” (Welby [1903] 1983, 250). Signs enter into semiosis – the 
act of signification, the production and interpretation of signs and sign systems in a 
constant open-ended process of knowledge. One sign leads to another, making a 
new sign through interpretation (interpretants) depending on how these signs are 
understood and interpreted in relation to reality, perception and cognition; Peirce 
defines this never-ending semiosis in his work What Is a Sign?: 
Symbols grow. They come into being by development out of other signs, particularly 
from likenesses or from mixed signs partaking of the nature of likenesses and symbols. 
We think only in signs. These mental signs are of mixed nature; the symbol-parts of 
them are called concepts. So it is only out of symbols that a new symbol can grow. 
Omne symbolum de symbolo. A symbol, once in being, spreads among the peoples. In 
use and in experience, its meaning grows. Such words as force, law, wealth, marriage, 
bear for us very different meanings from those they bore to our barbarous ancestors. 
[...] In all reasoning, we have to use a mixture of likenesses, indices, and symbols. (EP 
2.10, [1894], Peirce’s italics)
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A parallel idea is pondered by Welby, as we have seen, which makes it a central 
issue in all kinds of discussions about translation semiosis as theory and practice, 
as well as about truth and problem-solving as relativistic. As thinkers, readers and 
translators we can “read”, understand and interpret the signs of reality in various 
ways (cf. Peirce’s definitions of the concept of fallibilism).12
The Role of Context and Environment 
– The Sociality of Signs 
Welby seeks to use significs to explain the constitution of meaning as a synthesizing 
process, with “translation” as an essential method (Eschbach 1983, xvii). She started 
to built up significs from her own experience of a number of inadequacies in language 
and in the idea of language. As she had written earlier in Meaning and Metaphor 
(1891, 513): “we need a ‘Critique of Plain Meaning’!” (Welby [1911] 1985, 513). “For 
one thing meaning is not, and that is ‘plain’ in the sense of being the same at all 
times, in all places, and to all” (op. cit., 143); and: “There is nothing more curious 
than the prevalence of the myth of the ‘plain’ meaning which all can read at all times 
and in all places” (Welby [1903] 1983, 143, note 1). Therefore, the constitution of 
meaning has to be studied in how a word or term is “used”, in its “circumstances”.
According to Welby, ambiguity, the category of vagueness, “is the condition of 
the highest forms of expression” (Welby [1903] 1983, 74), but not even the context 
can bring any clarity to the subject, because the context itself is ambiguous to a 
higher degree (op. cit., 75). This condition, in the process of the constitution of 
meaning in a dynamic theory of meaning, is illustrated as “sense” by Welby. Like 
every sign, a linguistic sign acts primarily as an intermediary (Eschbach 1983, 
xviii), as does every vehicle of expression: all language is a form of translation, as 
quoted above (Welby [1903] 1983, 127). Here we have an important observation 
about the active aspect of a dynamic theory of meaning; the primary and original 
function of language is to represent actions and not objects, as Eschbach (1983, 
xix) also states. Hence, as Peirce states, a sign is only a sign when it is actively 
interpreted as a sign (EP 2.4–10, [1894]), that is, when it is translated into another 
sign during the process of constituting its meaning (Welby [1903] 1983, 192; cf. 
Eschbach 1983, xix). Welby’s method can be sketched simply: “We must begin 
in the broadest sense with Expression, and reach this through language” (Welby 
[1903] 1983, 250).13
12  Cf. Peirce’s theory of signs and semiosis, knowledge, interpretation, and understanding as 
relativistic truth; on the concept of fallibilism, cf. CP 1.171, [c. 1897] and Kukkonen (2001, 123, 
127–129, 135) as applied to translation studies; cf. also Merrell (2003, 165–188).
13  E.g. for the semiotics of Bakhtin (1981) and for Lotman (1990) the role of language was central.
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Welby’s main concern is the use of signs in communication, in “the universe 
of discourse”. “It is in this spirit then that we must postulate an analogy between 
Context and Environment: the adaptation of the word, as of the organism, to its 
surroundings, and conversely its effect upon these”, Welby states ([1903] 1983, 
40). She continues: “We strangely ignore the fact that comparison is our one way 
of acquiring or imparting knowledge; that no perception has its full ‘sense’, much 
less meaning, until we have started from its likeness to our correspondence with 
some other perception already ours; as we have seen, we forget that we cannot 
say one word to our fellow without assuming the analogy between his ‘mind’ and 
our own […]” (op. cit., 43). In agreement with Eschbach (1983, xxi), who sees 
Welby’s analogy between context and environment as a postulate, we can suggest 
the term “pragmatic maxim” for this testing procedure, even though she never 
used this expression herself. As Schmitz (1985, lxxx) states, Welby’s conception 
of the relation between signs and their meaning is “a mobile one” (cf. Peirce’s 
“immediate” and “dynamical object”, EP 2.477–483, [1906]), in contrast to the 
stable one that she criticizes. The meaning attributed to a sign is for her not only 
dependent on the context of use and situation, but at the same time on a series of 
purely subjective processes on the part of the person using the sign (Welby [1903] 
1983, 40–42). Significs can therefore be seen as a communication-oriented theory 
of signs (Schmitz 1985, lxxvi–lxxxviii), in which “all our ideas work through and by 
analogy” (Welby [1903] 1983, 42): 
But there is a method both of discovering, testing, and using analogy (or in some cases 
homology), the value of which does not yet seem to be recognised; and this may be 
called in an extended sense Translation (Welby ([1903] 1983, 126).
It must be borne in mind that although the term “translation” has been chosen because 
it is already used in at least part of the sense here suggested, it does not cover the 
whole ground required. Many words with the prefix “trans-“ represent one aspect of the 
process in question, e.g. transference, transformation, transmutation, transfiguration, 
and, above all, transvaluation. (Welby ([1903] 1983, 126, note 2)
For Welby translation in this new sense becomes a means both of testing 
knowledge and of widening its range. “Translation” consists of openly borrowing 
a statement or thesis by some master of thought and word and applying it, with 
some necessary changes, to another statement or thesis. Whether the result is a 
good fit, an incongruity, or falsification of an argument, it will prove equally useful 
as a “signific” exercise (op. cit., 129). As Eschbach (1983, xxiii) states, the analogy 
principle brings us to the core of the signific theory of meaning, which, according to 
him, reveals the most surprising parallels both to de Saussure’s theory of meaning 
and to Peirce’s semiotics. In Significs and Language ([1911] 1985, 13) Welby writes:
The most important elements of experience are distinction and unification, comparison 
and combination – analysis and synthesis. We first analyse what is called a confused 
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manifold, really a generic or “given” manifold. Then we synthetise what we have 
distinguished to the uttermost […]. (Welby ([1911] 1985, 13)
In comparison, we go from the familiar to the unknown, a level conveyed to us 
by signs, the level of manifestations of phenomena (Eschbach 1983, xxiii). The 
inference from the familiar to the unknown is a special kind of sign process, namely, 
a translation or sign interpretation to which Peirce gave the term “abduction”.14 
For Welby ([1903] 1983, 210) this translation process is something normal and 
commonplace: “The most natural and spontaneous tendency in man is the 
tendency to search out, to explore, to master the unknown; and the unknown in 
this case is the very reason and value of his being.” Peirce (EP 2.227, [1903]) 
calls the interpretation process “translation in sensu”, “the formation of perceptual 
judgments”, which build up a network of experiences to be compared with other 
systems so as to appreciate its validity or inadequacy. For Welby ([1903] 1983, 28, 
150), the interpretation process is “a potentially interminable flux”, as Eschbach 
(1983, xxv) states.15 Welby describes the dynamic process of interpretations: “We 
cannot cancel the automatic process of translative thinking. Everything suggests 
or reminds us of something else (Welby [1903] 1983, 34). Further, even “the fact 
that there is an experience, aside from what it is, is not the sensation itself; it is 
the interpretation of the sensation. It is part of the meaning” (Welby op. cit., 255, 
Welby’s italics). 
As early as in her essay Threefold Laws from 1886, Welby distinguishes 
the concept of meaning as triadic, operating between sense, meaning, and 
interpretation. In her book What Is Meaning? ([1903] 1983, 2) she talks about 
“sense”, “meaning”, and “significance”, also using the terms “tendency”, “intuition”, 
and “essential interest” to clarify the distinction between the former three terms. 
The fundamental triad also contains related locations such as “express meaning”, 
“meaning indicated”, and “meaning suggested” (op. cit., 46).16 This recalls a parallel 
pointed out by Eschbach (1983, xxv) as related to Karl Bühler’s (1934) distinctions 
based on his three-sided model of language as a means of communication, 
called the “organon-model” (from Greek organon: “tool”), a concept of three basic 
functional dimensions of language. Welby also uses the terms “signification”, 
“intention” and “ideal value” (Welby [1903] 1983, 46). As for sense, “the whole 
animal ‘kingdom’ (if not also the plant order) shares the senseworld” (op. cit., 28); 
14  On Peirce’s concept of “abduction”, cf. CP 7.164–231, [1901]; EP 2.75–114, [1901]. In Kukkonen 
(1993a, 149–172), on semiotics as a new paradigm of translation studies, as well as in Kukkonen 
(1993b, 43–45) and Kukkonen (2001, 121–138) following Peirce’s ontological categories, semiosis is 
discussed as a central method for education in translation, wherein knowledge of translation processes 
and products grows. This raises the issue of the heuristic view on problem-solving, and also see 
Merrell (2003, 165–188) on Peircean semiotics from the viewpoint of translation. On “abduction”, see 
Hartama-Heinonen in the present volume on abductive translation.
15  On flux in translation semiosis, cf. Kukkonen (2001, 121–138) and Merrell (2003, 165–187).
16  Cf. Schmitz (1985, xcvi–xcvii) for an overview of the variety of Welby’s terminology.
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sense is “the determining medium for every experience, every interpretation, every 
cognition, every behaviour and every prediction in the same way as letters, words, 
sentences, position, form or content are nothing other than means of conveying 
sense” (op. cit., 221). Sense functions as “means of message”, “and ‘message’ is 
meaningless unless it involves the idea ‘from somewhat to somewhat’, just as ‘link’ 
must needs be between two somewhats” (op. cit., 113). “Sense” gives expression 
to the value of experience; hence Welby sees “sense” as the connection between 
“the intellectual, the moral, and the aesthetic worlds” (op. cit., 48); sense exists in 
motion and change (cf. the idea of flux in semiosis). 
Thus, meaning is first of all intentional (Welby ([1903] 1983, 12). As the third 
level of meaning, significance comprehends the following: “it is rather their value for 
us, that which makes them signify for us, that which constitutes their importance, 
their moment, their consequence for mankind” (op. cit., 100). Significs consists of 
the triad of meaning with sense, meaning, and significance. The third aspect of 
meaning is also affected when it is a matter of deciding to what extent something 
is capable of expressing itself in, or being translated into, more and more phases 
of thought or branches of science (cf. ibid.). The third level of meaning emphasizes 
value, the axiological, moral aspect of meaning; significance can hence be seen 
as the integrative force of meaning (cf. Eschbach 1983, xxvii). “Significance, then, 
fully resumes, in transfigured form, all that is summed up (1) in the idea of Motion, 
force, energy, activity, function, (2) in the idea of sense (in all senses) and in that of 
Meaning (intention, purport, purpose)” (Welby [1903] 1983, 50).17
Welby tried to create a multifunctional tool ([1903] 1983, 4–7) for the study 
of signification, significs being a generic branch of knowledge, a kind of applied 
philosophy. Significs, as interpreted by Eschbach (1983, xxviii), is “a practical 
procedure by which, starting from an understanding of the mutually supportive 
interdependence of the constitutions of sign and meaning, an attempt can be made 
to meet the urgent necessity”. He continues with a quotation from Welby ([1903] 
1983, 57f.): “[…] of stimulating thought by the creation of a general interest in the 
logical and practical as well as the aesthetical value of all forms of Expression”. 
In accordance with the concept of knowledge in semiosis in constant flux,18 
each semiosis, as translation semiosis, is a dialogue between implicit or explicit, 
increasing or decreasing information. In his letter to Welby in the spring of 1906, 
Peirce (CP 2.477, [1906]) writes about his use of the word “Sign” in the “widest 
sense for any medium for the communication or extension of a Form (or feature)”. 
In the act of signification, in the production and interpretation of signs, in semiosis, 
signs are in “flux”. Margolis talks about the central concept of flux in his book 
17  Peirce remarks on Welby’s three modes of meaning: “One can see, though she does not remark 
it, that her three kinds of meaning correspond roughly to Hegel’s three stages of thought” (CP 
8.174). 
18  Cf. note 11.
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The Flux of History and the Flux of Science (1993), referring to the specificity and 
individuality of how phenomena get various meanings in different contexts.19 In 
analogy, understanding implicit information as a phenomenon (e.g., as occurs in 
translation proper), is a question of both understanding and of the emergence of 
the concept of knowledge, as when new knowledge becomes our “own” knowledge 
during heuristic processes; it involves also ethics, aesthetics, empirical experience, 
emotions and intuition. The crucial journey of semiotic interpretation is to explore 
the semiosis, the acts that manifest meanings; in analysing texts and translated 
texts we make the implicit explicit through interpretative and translative thinking 
(cf. Welby [1903] 1983, 5–6). In this process, we use “translation” as a method 
for rendering implicit information as explicit information, which is the movement of 
signs toward significance, the universal idea of semiosis.20 
Knowledge in growth is always an hypothesis, as Plato noted as early as the 
Meno. In his The Basis of Pragmaticism in the Normative Sciences (EP 2.371–
397, [1906]) Peirce writes about logic, the general theory of signs, and how 
signs and knowledge grow, as well as on his relativistic truth, fallibilism, which 
emphasises not only the uncertain nature of science but its dynamic character. In 
translation studies (translation proper) we are dealing with revision, re-revisions, 
error elimination (cf. Popper 1972, passim; Chesterman 1997, 16–17, 117–145) 
and new signs, in an open-ended process of semiosis, the evolution of knowledge 
(EP 2.373–374, [1906]).21
Theory of Value – Intersemiotic Translation 
– a Hermeneutic Understanding
As discussed above, we can say that Welby’s significs represents an early version 
of global semiotics (Sebeok 2001). Hers was an effort to shape a global semiosis, 
with her concept of “universe of signs” with special reference to language, and to 
translation in a broad sense. To describe the constitution of meaning, in context 
and situation, she advocated the method of analogy and comparison, i.e., the 
modeling and dialogue of signs and sign systems, in this way reaching the notion 
of translative thinking, of “transvaluation”, i.e., semioethics. “To be significant 
means to have value”, writes Petrilli (2003b, 47, her italics), who explains the 
term “significance” as used by Welby in triadic correlation with the other two 
terms, “sense” and “meaning”. In accordance with Petrilli (ibid.), we can say after 
19  Cf. Kukkonen (2001, 121–138); Merrell (2003, 174–175).
20  Leech [1974] 1985, 319–323, 328–329. On Peirce’s “pragmatism”, cf. EP 2.133–257, [1903]; 
Morris [1938] 1971, 301–303, 329; see also Morris 1938, 55–59, chapter entitled “The Unity of 
Semiotic. 1. Meaning”.
21  On Plato’s dialogue Theaetetus (c. 367 B.C.) in relation to the question “What is knowledge?” in 
translation studies, see Kukkonen (2001, 121–138).
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reading Welby, that the “meaning” of action presupposes “sense”, “understood 
as a derivative of ‘to sense’ and not only as ‘orientation’, ‘direction’, in a given 
communicative context” (Petrilli 2003b, 47, 48). Welby’s writings focus closely on 
the relation between signs and values.22
Welby’s writings, according also to Eschbach (1983, xxi), postulate an analogy 
between context and environment; the term “pragmatic maxim” is used for this 
testing procedure. From the point of view of today’s semiotics and “semioethics”, a 
termed coined by Ponzio and Petrilli (cf. Petrilli 2004a, 3–4, 9; 2004b, 31–35), we 
can state that Welby, and after her the behaviourist and pragmatist Morris, were 
early representatives of those concerned with the relation between sign theory 
and value theory, and with so-called “interpretation semiotics” (e.g., Peirce, Welby, 
Morris, Bakhtin, Rossi-Landi). Petrilli ([2000] 2003c, 14) states that “as a global 
science of signs, semiotics must focus upon all aspects of semiosis without ignoring 
what is understood by the terms ‘signification’ and ‘significance.’” “Semioethics”, 
according to Petrilli, contributes to
a global understanding of human beings in the entirety of their relations to themselves, 
to the world, and to others. Therefore, with respect to “semiotics”, the term “semioethics” 
is intended to highlight that particular orientation in sign studies that is not purely 
descriptive, that does not claim to be neutral. From the viewpoint of theory of knowledge, 
semioethics evidences the axiological dimension of sign processes beyond, or, better, 
in conjunction with the strictly logical-cognitive aspects. (Petrilli [2000] 2003c, 14–15)
In fact, Welby’s significs had already mentioned these aspects, while it also covered 
language philosophy, semantics and semiotics, the study of signs and meaning, 
value, transvaluation, i.e., the whole problem of significance and signification. 
Significs is a communication-oriented theory of “use” and “discursive thinking”, as is 
Morris’s research concerning communication among the order of signs and the order 
of values. Various kinds of translation are based on interpretation and message; but 
a communicative view of meaning should also shed light on ethics as well.
The triadic idea connected Welby and Peirce: Welby talks about significs, Peirce 
about “semeiotic”. Semiosis, as the dynamic act of signification, is the joint idea. 
She, as we have seen, did not use “translation” in the sense of “translation proper”, 
the interlingual mode of translation, but in the intralingual and intersemiotic mode, 
intersemiotic being a better term to describe all kinds of translation semiosis (cf. 
Jakobson [1959], 1987, 428–435). Welby’s method of “translation” as a “practice”, 
as a heuristic method of significs, emphasises the semantics and pragmatics, the 
functional and communicative aspects in discourse. Translation is a means of 
22  Cf. Petrilli 2003b, 47–48, note 8. Also, Morris ([1938] 1971, 35–42; [1946] 1971, 140–171; [1964] 
1971, 401–414) writes about the dual meaning of “meaning”: “signification” as the action in which 
something signifies, in a semantic sense, or as “significance” as the value of that which is signified, 
in an axiological sense; on Morris’s semiotic, cf. Petrilli (2003b, 48 and [2000] 2003, 1–19).
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pursuing new knowledge. Intralingual “translation” can serve as a multifunctional 
tool for all kinds of translation, both interlingual and intersemiotic. Creative 
processes of knowing and problem-solving may start with intralingual translation 
and continue to ponder translation as both process and product. We can say that 
all thinking is translation of thoughts; “we cannot cancel the translative process of 
thinking”, as Welby wrote. 
What Welby dubbed significs, from the end of 19th century and the beginning 
of the 20th century, can be seen as an important study of “meaning” as sense, 
meaning, and significance. Though her descriptive style has to be understood 
in the idiom of the time, and even though she may lack a rigorously systematic 
methodological presentation of her ideas, she nevertheless presents a proto-theory, 
a fundamental theory of signs and their interpretation. Significs has “sundry merits”, 
wrote Peirce (CP 2.255–256, [1903], when discussing issues of sense, meaning, 
and significance. Among the central semiotic issues of today, questions of value 
are paramount. For example, Petrilli (2004a; 2004b, “semioetica”, “semioethics” 
coined by Ponzio & Petrilli), as well as Tarasti (2000; 2005, “existential semiotics”), 
Bernard (2005, “semioethics”), and Deeley (2005, “semioethics) have discussed 
“semioethics” in various contexts. Welby was among the first to do so, a “pre-
semiotician”, who combined in her significs semiotic ideas about values and 
transvaluation, applying them to the problem of sense, meaning, and significance. 
She did so using the method of “translative thinking”, as she called translation. 
The question of values and ethics in various fields is a pressing one in many 
fields today. Deeley (2005, 8) points out, with reference to Petrilli on semioethics 
and translation in various forms: “[. . .] the ‘translation’ can only be understood ‘in the 
broadest sense possible, that is to say, beyond the limits of interlingual translation, 
translation as interpretation and verification of verbal and nonverbal signs alike’”: 23
[…] the boundaries of semiotic reality are never fixed and always shifting is the key 
realization for this new, this postmodern, humanism, wherein traditional objective 
“ethics” is transformed as “semioethics” by the discovery that human knowledge in the 
whole oft its extent – speculative no less than practical – depends upon the action of 
signs, an action that is presupposed to every “world of objects”, every Umwelt around 
the whole planet (or elsewhere in this universe, as the case may be). Things may pre-
exist us in various ways, but only as they are translated into objects can we intelligently 
23  See also Torop (2003, 271–282), and Petrilli (2003a, 17–37, 2003b, 41–53) on “intersemiotic 
translation”; Ponzio (2003a, 13–16) on “translation as a sign process”; and Petrilli 2004a, 3–4, 9; 
2004b, 23–38 on “global semiotics” and “semioethics”. See also Bernard 2005, 1–4: “[…] the point 
where ethics as the basis of all action enters, together with biosemiotics, resting, first of all, on Jakob 
von Uexküll’s semio-umwelt-theory, on Sebeok’s ‘global semiotics’, and Lady Welby’s early semiotic 
preoccupation with ethics, Susan Petrilli and Augusto Ponzio have for the first time postulated a 
semio-ethics stringently derived from semiosis itself, an ethics which should orient us not only in view 
of the challenges of today’s societies but also in our actions within the increasing ecological crisis. 
Thus, besides the indispensable socio-semiotic analysis of society and culture we are also in need of 
a biosemiotic one studying their umwelt interdependencies, […]”. (Bernard 2005, 4)
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deal with them. And since there is (and can be) no single path for this translation, 
it is especially the procedures of abductive logic on which we above all depend for 
the translation, and the “translation” can only be understood “in the broadest sense 
possible, […].” (Deeley 2005, 8)
The three modes of translation presented by Jakobson, and “translative thinking” 
along with interpretative and communicative translation by Welby, are essential 
methods with which semiotics and all kinds of translation studies can understand 
the essential nature of “meaning” (sense, meaning and significance) in various 
universes of discourses and states of mind, as manifested in source and target 
languages, and in all kinds of texts in communication. In this process, “translation” 
as a method, and “translation” in its various forms and manifestations has to include 
significs and its accompanying theory of value. All this lays the foundation for the 
hermeneutic triangle of translation, interpretation and meaning. Especially relevant 
are Welby’s ideas on language and “translation”, when we recall Gadamer’s ([1960] 
1993, 383–389, 396, 527–528; [1976] 1997, 59–68) hermeneutic view on man and 
language, translation and interpretation. The very goal is to gain understanding, 
to avoid misunderstanding, and to promote self-understanding. Welby also 
discussed “translation” as a universal method for science, which is what we today 
call “interdisciplinarity”. Different kinds of translation semiosis and translation 
studies require a highly interdisciplinary approach (cf. Chesterman 2005, 19–28). 
Studies on causality in translation studies, for instance (as by Chesterman 2002: 
145–158) show how the Greimassian (1983) semiotic modalities (être Being, faire 
Doing, devoir To be obliged to, savoir To know, pouvoir To be able to and vouloir To 
want) can be applied to translation as effect and cause. This involves ontological, 
epistemological, and translation-sociological aspects as well, i.e., questions 
of norms, ethics and values (global semiotics, global semiosis, semioethics). 
Relevant here is Welby’s significs as a theory of knowledge and a general theory 
of semiotics, the science of signs and sign systems, including “transvaluation” and 
values, concerning the triadic system of meaning as sense, meaning as intention, 
and meaning as significance; and on the highest level, a theory of value. She saw 
the importance of “interdisciplinarity” and axiology to science. In 1938, Morris wrote: 
It is doubtful if signs have ever before been so vigorously studied by so many persons 
and from so many points of view. The army of investigators includes linguists, 
logicians, philosophers, psychologists, biologists, anthropologists, psychopathologists, 
aestheticians, and sociologists. (Morris 1938: 1) 
Today, we can say that semiotics has become “a world science”, as predicted 
by Wouters ([1997] 2003, 8): 
As far as trends are concerned, sign studies will undoubtedly continue to focus on the 
larger contexts of signs. In other words, semiotics will evolve more and more towards 
a global semiotics that envisages an understanding of signs in human behaviour and 
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in nature in general. In this pansemiotic view, the emphasis will be on the sign outside 
linguistics. (Wouters [1997] 2003, 8)
Meaning, as conceived triadically by Peirce and Welby, has relevance for the 
global semiotics and semioethics of today. Significs was really a new starting 
point, as Welby herself wrote in 1903; her ideas are reflected in Peirce’s, Ogden’s, 
and Morris’s views on signs and values. Such issues are specially relevant today, 
when we discuss global matters, values and ethics in various fields of human 
knowledge. Translation is the critical heuristics of problem-solving, and it comes 
in many forms: in language, culture, communication, in anthroposemiosphere, 
in semiosphere and biosphere as well, there is various translation processes 
going on, or as Peirce states (EP 2.394; CP 5.448n, [1906]): “all this universe 
is perfused with signs”, and all signification is but the “translation of a sign 
into another system of signs” (CP 4.127) – intersemiotic translation is a life-
generating, the life-crowning activity: “Simply the whole of human intercourse” 
using Welby’s expression ([1903] 1983, 36). Therefore, studies on semiosis, the 
act of signification, is of paramount import in human understanding of sense, 
meaning, and significance. In 1903, Welby writes about significs, significance 
and the ‘universe of discourse’, as “the assimilating, the life-generating, the life-
crowning term”, “essential value”, and “the power of inter-translation”, in 1984 
Eco talks about “interpretability”, and “the whole universe of semiosis”:
“Significance, … is the gathering, the concentrating into its focus of radiation; it is in a 
deep and predictive sense the assimilating, the life-generating, the life-crowning term. 
All systems also inevitably concentrate in Significance as their essential value as test. 
And thus Significs alone gives us the power of inter-translation.” (Welby [1903] 1983, 
119–120)
A sign is not only something which stands for something else; it is also something that 
can and must be interpreted. The criterion of interpretability allows us to start from a 
given sign to cover, step by step, the whole universe of semiosis.” (Eco 1984, 46)
We can state that semiosis is the act of signification in all kinds of “inter-
translation” concerning interpretation of signs and sign systems. In translation 
studies, Chesterman (2005, 25) states that “from the consilience point of view, 
modern translation studies thus announces itself as a new attempt to cut across 
boundaries in the search for deeper understanding of the relations between texts, 
societies and cultures”. If we see, as Chesterman (ibid.) writes, “translations as 
carriers of memes, and Translation Studies as part of memetics, we may be able 
to embed our field more readily into the study of evolution more generally. By 
exploring the parallels between biological and cultural evolution, we may perhaps 
make a few constructive steps in the direction of consilience.” Welby was one of the 
pioneers in showing the interdisciplinary idea of “Significs” and “inter-translation”, 
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how they spread as memes in semiotics, and how they are relevant to the global 
semiotics and semioethics of today.
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